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At around 10:30 in the morning of April 24, 1948, four men, three Koreans and 
one Japanese, stormed into the Hyogo Prefecture Building (kencho¯) and demanded an 
audience with Governor Kishida Yukio.  Their purpose remained unchanged from 
previous attempts to see the governor—to discuss his April 10 order that the four Ko-
rean ethnic schools in his jurisdiction cease operations and that the students be trans-
ferred to Japanese schools.  Kishida, who was at another meeting, informed their Japa-
nese spokesman, Horikawa Kazutomo, that he would see them later.  One half-hour 
later, the governor was told that about one hundred Koreans had forced their way into 
the building.  He soon heard them yelling “Open up, open up.  We will kill you,” as 
they destroyed one of his outer ofﬁces.  Then ﬁfty to sixty Koreans forced their way 
into Kishida’s ofﬁce by breaking down the wall that separated his ofﬁce from the outer 
ofﬁce they had been destroying.  They cut his telephone lines, trashed his furniture, 
and began roughing up the governor and the mayor of Kobe, who had been meeting 
with Kishida.
The intruders then sat the governor at his desk and the three negotiators, Kim 
Daisam [T’aesam], Kim Yongho, and Ryang Minseo [Minso˘], presented their de-
mands.  Kishida was to rescind his order to close the Korean schools, release the sixty-
ﬁve Koreans arrested during a previous incident at the assistant governor’s ofﬁce, and 
see to it that no one involved in the present incident faced prosecution.  At 12:30, 
three United States Military Police ofﬁcers arrived and attempted to escort Kishida to 
safety.  However, a crowd of Koreans who had gathered in the building prevented 
them from doing so.  The crowd also roughed up the military policemen, lifting one 
“off his feet.”  When one of the policemen drew his pistol a Korean woman bared her 
chest and baited him to “shoot here.”  Negotiations ﬁnally ended around 17:00 when 
the governor agreed in writing to release those arrested during the previous incident.
Throughout the day a crowd had been assembling outside the prefecture building. 
Captain Roy M. Johnson reported that by 11:30 these people, who numbered over 
3,000, “had ceased to be a crowd; [they had formed] a mob.”  Their presence prevent-
ed help from entering the building until a team of 150 policemen succeeded in physi-
cally dragging “actively resisting” people away and roped off the area.  When at 17:00 
one of the intruders announced from a window that the governor had rescinded his 
order to close the schools, “the mob went crazy” and “marched down Illinois Avenue” 
waving the Korean ﬂag.2)
Their jubilation was short-lived.  That evening, the Supreme Commander Allied 
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Powers (SCAP), which had ordered the schools closed in the ﬁrst place, issued its ﬁrst 
(and only) state of emergency during its seven-year tenure in Japan.  From midnight 
the Kobe police, acting on orders from Eighth Army Commander General Robert 
Eichelberger, went on a “Korean hunt” (Cho¯senjin gari ) that aimed to arrest anyone 
who “looked Korean.”  The hunt rounded up 1,732 people, including Okinawans, Tai-
wanese, and Japanese, of whom 39 were tried for “leading demonstrations.”3)  Later 
that day, Japanese police entered the Korean ethnic schools, physically removed the 
students, and nailed shut the doors.
Eichelberger also rescinded the promises that the governor had made to the Kore-
ans on April 24.  In total, seventy-ﬁve people (including one Japanese) were brought 
to trial and, save for four acquitted Koreans, all were found guilty of one or more of 
the following charges: unlawfully entering the governor’s ofﬁce, destroying ofﬁce fur-
nishings, threatening the governor, detaining the governor, interfering with Occupa-
tion and Hyogo Prefecture communications, and assaulting Occupation force mem-
bers.  The four people who initiated the incident, along with three other Koreans, 
were tried by the United States Military Commission and received sentences ranging 
from ten to ﬁfteen years of hard labor.  Nine other Koreans, tried by the General Pro-
vost Court of Kobe, received sentences that ranged from three months to four years 
and nine months of hard labor.  A total of ﬁfty-two Koreans were ﬁned 50 yen.4)
The court summary provided explicit details of the destructive and violent actions 
of the Korean participants, but failed to adequately consider the anger and frustration 
that fueled them.  We learn of the intruders’ primary motivation—to make the gover-
nor rescind his order to close the schools—only through the demands that they issued 
to the governor.  The court summary did not explain the reasons why SCAP ordered 
the schools’ closures.  Nor did it offer explanation as to why the Korean people might 
react to this order as they did.  It also neglected to note the attempts that Koreans had 
made to gain audiences with the governor prior to April 24, or the governor’s stone-
walling—his ofﬁce had told the Koreans that the governor was out of town—to avoid 
having to meet them.5)
The tone of the court summary reﬂected the negative attitudes that Americans and 
Japanese directed toward “uncooperative” elements in Japan at the time, among 
whom included Koreans residing in both Japan and Korea.  As today, the approxi-
mately 650,000 Japan-based Koreans then represented the country’s largest alien pop-
ulation.  The arrogant attitude that many Koreans had adopted at the war’s end to-
ward their former colonial masters had gained them a reputation as troublemakers in 
Figure 1: Koreans on trial in Kobe
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the eyes of both American and Japanese authorities.  Their insistence on educating 
their children in Korean ethnic schools irked particularly the U.S. administration in at 
least two ways.  Americans ﬁrst saw their recalcitrance as an insult to U.S. authority as 
it blatantly deﬁed SCAP orders that they integrate their children into the Japanese 
school system.  Secondly, it demonstrated again the generally uncooperative behavior 
that Koreans had displayed throughout the duration of the Occupation to date, be it 
through working in black markets or collaborating with the Japanese Communist Par-
ty.  To many, the obvious solution to the Korean problem was that they all be sent 
“home.”  Yet, this was not easy for a number of reasons, including the fact that many 
younger Japan-based Koreans knew of no other home than Japan.6)
Letters sent by Elizabeth Ryan, a court reporter stationed in Kobe in 1947–1948, to 
her family in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, expanded on the court summary’s descriptions 
of the Kobe “riots” by articulating general impressions that Americans and Japanese 
held toward the incident, the Korean participants, as well as the Korean people in gen-
eral.7)  Her writing provides a view that enhances our understanding of the incident 
from a Japan-based American perspective.  Ryan’s letters also suggest outside inﬂu-
ence from her colleagues.  Their content informs us of the general conceptions (and 
misconceptions) that Occupation and Japanese administrations held toward Koreans 
in Japan, but also in southern Korea.  Furthermore, these perspectives contribute to 
our understanding of how the United States viewed long-held conﬂicts between Japa-
nese and Koreans, and the growing political unrest in southern Korea that contributed 
to the outbreak of civil war in 1950.
The Korean “Rioters” Slapped Uncle Sam in the Face
The details that Elizabeth Ryan entered into her letters reﬂected positively those re-
corded in the court summary outlined above, though she admitted that her informa-
tion came primarily from a shortwave broadcast out of Los Angeles.8)  She ﬁrst ad-
dressed the “riots” in an April 27, 1948, letter that she sent to alert her family of her 
safety.  Here Ryan described the incident and accused the Koreans of insulting the 
United States—they slapped Uncle Sam’s face—by refusing to send their children to 
Japanese schools as required by Japan’s recently promulgated constitution.
What it boils down to is this.  The Japanese constitution, under which they are 
now to run their country, was set up by SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied 
Powers, the organization revolving around Mac [MacArthur]) and it called for a 
Figure 2: Elizabeth Ryan (far left) with friends in Kobe
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certain schools system with a certain curriculum, etc.  The Japanese have accept-
ed it and are putting it into effect, which means closing the 4 Korean schools in 
Kobe.  The Koreans don’t want their children to go to Japanese schools and have 
protested.  While that may be well and good, it is really not the Japanese idea in 
the school but the American, and so indirectly a slap in the face for Uncle Sam 
because the Koreans have rejected the school system.  On Saturday morning 70 
Koreans visited the Prefecture headquarters and really tore things apart.  The 
Governor had them put in jail—and that set off the ﬁre.
The incident spread concern that, as indicated by the display of power that SCAP 
demonstrated in its immediate aftermath, such Korean behavior would spread 
throughout Japan.  Ryan wrote that General Menoher’s declaration of a “minor state 
of emergency” brought the Occupation’s top ofﬁcials to Kobe.  Soon after this declara-
tion was issued, orders went out from SCAP to arrest “every last Korean.”  Her obser-
vations here reﬂect the seriousness with which SCAP viewed the incident, perhaps be-
cause of its generally negative impression of Japan’s Korean population.  She writes:
Headquarters Kobe Base (Shinko Bldg) looked for all the world like it might be 
the gold deposit for the world—all the cars lined up in front in “stand by,” 
guards with helmets and guns patrolling every 10 feet—an air of excitement all 
over.  The order went out from the “brains” that every last Korean was to be ar-
rested and by 4 o’clock last evening they had 1500 of them in jail.
Ryan predicted that the Koreans would be tried fairly, but then suggested that they 
may be made scapegoats so as to discourage the outbreak of similar incidents in the 
future.
Special courts and staffs of lawyers are coming down from Tokyo and Yokohama 
to assist in the speedy trial of these people.  They will be tried in our Provost 
Court instead of the Japanese court—and they probably will get it, but good.  I 
have heard from some of the ofﬁcers who were in the conference that it really 
wasn’t too bad, but if we let it go by unnoticed, the way things have gone in the 
rest of the world, this could be only the beginning.
Ryan returned to Milwaukee just as the trials reached their conclusion and thus she 
does not comment further on the sentencing of those involved.  Her short reports of 
the incident are as informative for what they contain as they are for what they omit. 
Her suggestion that the Kobe incident might serve as the ﬁrst of a series of riots across 
Japan suggests that she was ignorant of the fact that the Kobe incident was just the 
most recent of a series of similar incidents that took place in Yamaguchi (March 31), 
Okayama (April 8), Hyogo (April 10), Osaka (April 12), and Tokyo (April 20).9)  A sec-
ond Osaka demonstration held on April 26 attracted 30,000 people.
Also striking is her contention that the Koreans violated United States, rather than 
Japanese, law—by rejecting the constitutionally authorized Japanese school system 
they slapped Uncle Sam’s face.  She elaborated on this point in a May 4 letter where 
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she wrote, “SCAP … set up a constitution which was accepted by the Japanese and 
the allied powers as workable.  In the constitution it stated that a certain school system 
would be set up—the whole curriculum has to be changed to weed out their former 
teachings against democracy, etc.  The Koreans had their own schools, 4 of which 
were in Kobe, and would not move out of their school buildings.”
Her claim that Japan’s postwar constitution legitimized closing the Korean ethnic 
schools is problematic in a number of ways.  First, this document had much to say 
about promoting a democratic education system but nothing to say about the curricu-
lum that would guide this education.  The constitution’s “education clause,” Article 26, 
reads as follows:
All people shall have the right to an equal education correspondent to their abili-
ty, as provided for by law.  2) All people shall be obligated to have all boys and 
girls under their protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. 
Such compulsory education shall be free.10)
If anything, this document, in requiring “equal education correspondent to their abili-
ty” legitimized the continued existence of the Korean ethnic schools.  Indeed, after re-
ceiving orders to close these schools Japanese lawmakers debated whether this action 
would constitute a violation of this very document.11)
The Fundamental Law of Education (Kyo¯iku kihonho¯) passed by the Japanese gov-
ernment in March 1947 reinforced the rights guaranteed by Japan’s postwar constitu-
tion.  Sometimes described as a revision of the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education, 
this legislation’s preamble declared as Japan’s intention to build “a democratic and 
cultural state” dependent on the “power of education.”  It stipulated in Article 5 that 
Japan’s education system would be compulsory (gimu), and that “nationals” (kokumin) 
would be guaranteed free access to this education.  It further stipulated in Article 4 
that this education would provide “nationals” with “equal opportunities without dis-
crimination by race, creed, sex, social status, economic position, or family origin.”
It was not until later that year, when the Japanese government passed the School 
Education Act (Gakko¯ kyo¯ikuho¯) that we ﬁnd any mention of the language or content 
that this education was to assume.  Article 21, no. 5 of this legislation stipulated as a 
goal students being able to “correctly understand the national language (kokugo, or Jap-
anese) as necessary for their daily lives,” and to understand the present conditions and 
history of their country and villages.  It was the formation of the postwar Ministry of 
Education, rather than legislation, which established the curriculum to which, in 
SCAP’s eyes, the Korean schools should adhere.  In January 1947 the Ministry, acting 
under SCAP orders, notiﬁed prefectural governors of the inclusion of the Korean 
schools.  It had to repeat this order one year later after the prefectures refused to en-
force it.12)
These documents specifying that Japanese education regulations applied to “nation-
als” (kokumin ) further complicated Ryan’s argument that the Koreans violated the con-
stitution by refusing to send their children to Japanese schools.  Her lack of knowledge 
alerts us to the precarious position that Koreans in Japan faced, particularly regarding 
their legal status.  Ryan might have been aware that in May 1947, just months prior to 
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SCAP’s January 1948 announcement that Koreans would be treated as “Japanese na-
tionals,” SCAP reversed course by subjecting Japan-based Koreans and Taiwanese to 
its Alien Registration Ordinance.  Mirrored after the U.S. Alien Registration Act of 
1940, it required all non-Japanese over the age of 14 to register their alien status and 
carry with them at all times their alien registration passbook.  It further stipulated that 
violators would face deportation.  This legislation served as the forerunner for the 
more comprehensive Alien Registration Act of 1952 that introduced mandatory ﬁn-
gerprinting of foreign residents.13)  This Act, along with the U.S. occupation authorities 
rescinding the Korean residents’ voting rights, did not constitute the Korean people 
losing their Japanese nationality.  The Japanese government never legally recognized 
Koreans as Japanese, as is evident by its forcing Koreans to maintain their ofﬁcial resi-
dency (honsekichi ) in their ancestral homeland (Korea) rather than have it transferred 
to their adopted homeland ( Japan) either during the colonial period or after surrender 
on August 15, 1945.14)
The Koreans’ options were limited.  To avoid having their children enrolled in Jap-
anese schools, the Kobe schools could have joined other Korean schools in applying 
for private school status.  This would have permitted their children to study with their 
Korean, rather than Japanese, counterparts.  They would have remained subjected to 
a Japanese-based curriculum as private schools, too, were required to follow Ministry 
of Education regulations.  Their other option (relocating to Korea) perhaps met the 
general intentions of the two seemingly contradictory legislative actions by SCAP—to 
rid Japan of its Korean problem.  American residents in Japan, like Ryan, justiﬁed this 
response by claiming that Koreans had no desire to assimilate into Japanese society—
they were simply interested in causing trouble—and thus had no business remaining 
in Japan.  This conclusion, that they should return from where they came, demonstrat-
ed the shallow understanding of Ryan (and no doubt other Americans) of why Japan 
housed such a large Korean population, as well as the colonial-era roots of the postwar 
animosity Koreans harbored toward the Japanese people.
Koreans Have Been “Pains in the Neck”
SCAP’s generally negative attitude toward the Korean people partially fueled its 
harsh reaction to the riots.  Since the beginning of the occupation Koreans had been 
rather uncooperative.  Soon after the war’s end they, along with Japan-based Taiwan-
ese and Japanese, participated in black market activities.  Many Koreans joined the 
left-wing Chaeil Choso˘nin yo˘nmaeng (League of Koreans in Japan), which maintained ties 
with the Japanese Communist Party.  Reports on the Kobe incident emphasized that 
its leaders belonged to this group, and that their followers, being people of limited in-
telligence, were easily swayed by this wayward inﬂuence.  Ryan echoed these views in 
her letters.  On April 27 she remarked that these troublemakers, who were driven by 
leftist agitators, provided the Japanese police with a test to prove their capacity to 
maintain law and order.
The Koreans have been a pain in the neck all along.  They have some strange 
notion that they are the Occupationaires, and really give these Japs a hard time. 
They go into shops and board street cars with no intention of paying.  The poor 
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Jap was scared to do anything about it because he got beat up.  So ﬁnally, we had 
to tell them to settle the thing with their own law enforcement agencies (have to 
let them stand on their feet) and we would back them up to quell rioting, etc.  All 
this Korean business is Communist-instilled.15)
In an undated letter she repeated the claim that “much [Korean] activity is Communis-
tic” adding that the recent “uprising … among Japanese and Koreans” was hardly un-
usual.  “It happened all the time.”
American images of Koreans had never been overly positive.  Their negative views 
were evident in the U.S. being one of the ﬁrst governments to recognize Japan’s para-
mount position on the peninsula in 1905, and among the ﬁrst to bless its annexation of 
Korea ﬁve years later.  Even after the U.S. went to war with Japan, calls could still be 
heard for Japan to be allowed to keep Korea.16)  A report titled “Aliens in Japan,” com-
pleted in June 1945, before the end of the war, incorporated many negative attitudes 
frequently seen in Japanese writing on Koreans.
The Koreans in Japan are, for the most part, a distinct minority group with a low 
social and economic position.  Koreans generally live apart from Japanese, do 
not intermarry, and are not assimilated into Japanese life to any great extent. 
The traditional pattern of Korean migration was based on the seasonal need for 
labor in Japan and the migrants’ desire to return to Korea for the New Year holi-
days.
The report also borrowed images used by the Japanese (and other colonizers) to justify 
colonial annexation: The people lack the “Japanese fever for hard work [and] appear 
to be slow moving and lazy.”17)
American Consul Douglas Jenkins, who was stationed in Kobe, also viewed Kore-
ans as left-wing troublemakers, and suggested that they marched to Moscow’s orders.
There are between 60,000 and 70,000 Koreans in Kobe.  The great majority of 
them were imported by the Japanese during the war for manual labor.  They are 
of the low type generally, poorly educated and include among their number a 
high number of thugs and roughnecks.  …  This large, boisterous and dissatisﬁed, 
alien group in the population of the city is an easy prey to organizers and agita-
tors.  They are known to include among their leaders a number of communists 
and quasi-communists who probably receive instructions from Northern Korea 
or, if not that closely associated, certainly follow the party line.18)
Ryan’s and Jenkins’s appraisals of this minority suggest misconceptions of the peo-
ple’s purpose for both coming to and remaining in Japan.  The contention that the 
“great majority” of them came as forced laborers is probably inaccurate.  Among the 
estimated 2.4 million Koreans in Japan at the end of the war, about one-third (or 
700,000) had been forced to come to Japan to perform hard labor.19)  After the war, 
these people were given high repatriation priority.  They thus lacked many of the rea-
sons that kept Koreans from returning: their inability to bring their entire estate to Ko-
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rea and their insufﬁcient knowledge of the Korean language and culture.  Those who 
characterized the participants in the incident as “thugs” or “roughnecks” emphasized 
their actions over their general purpose, to say nothing of their frustrations over hav-
ing to endure forced assimilation as second-rate residents during the four decades of 
colonial rule.  To many Koreans, SCAP’s education policies mirrored Japan’s colonial-
era policy that forced their children to study in a Japanese-centered environment while 
facing discrimination and harassment.
The belief that the “rioters” were “communists and quasi-communists [who toed] 
the party line” also reﬂected an impression that SCAP ofﬁcials had developed soon af-
ter the war’s end in southern Korea.  In mid-September 1945, just weeks after the U.S. 
had established its Military Government in southern Korea, Political Adviser H. Mer-
rell Benninghoff included the following in his “brief analysis of conditions in Korea.”
There is little doubt that Soviet agents are spreading their political thought 
throughout southern Korea, and several parades and demonstrations in Seoul 
have admittedly been communist-inspired.  Communists advocate the seizure 
now of Japanese properties and may be a threat to law and order.  It is probable 
that well-trained agitators are attempting to bring about chaos in our area so as to 
cause the Koreans to repudiate the United States in favor of Soviet “freedom” 
and control.  Southern Korea is a fertile ground for such activities because 
USAFIK lacks sufﬁcient troops to expand its area of control rapidly.20)
This summary was partially accurate in its claim: many Koreans in postwar Japan did 
harbor communist or leftwing sympathies.  However, it is a gross exaggeration to sug-
gest that all Koreans, or even the vast majority of Koreans, held these views.  Also, lit-
tle evidence exists that demonstrates these groups were inﬂuenced by Moscow.  Their 
roots, as Ken C. Kawashima has recently demonstrated, stemmed more from the colo-
nial-era ties they formed with Japanese leftist groups to combat ill treatment by Japa-
nese management.21)  The Korean Peninsula connection with Japan came with the 
smuggling operations that Koreans and Japanese carried out across the East Sea/Sea 
of Japan.  Occasionally concerns were voiced in government documents as to whether 
these operations, in addition to the illegal transport of rice, weapons, money, and even 
people, were solidifying Soviet Union-North Korea-Japan leftist connections.22)  Again, 
while this allegation may hold some truth, other plausible explanations exist, too. 
First, strict repatriation regulations forced people with larger estates to seek alternative 
routes home.  Also, participation in this “illegal trade” may have materialized from the 
opportunities that the breakup of the organized “legal trade” networks provided.
These character slurs neglected to consider why Koreans objected so strongly to de-
cisions that forced them to live under Japanese jurisdiction despite the hardships they 
had endured under colonial rule.  The majority had not been brought to Japan against 
their will, as Ryan claimed.  While, as the report “Aliens in Japan” explained, many of 
Japan’s Korean minority had resisted assimilation, the actions and attitudes of Japa-
nese had also discouraged even those Koreans who wished to live as Japanese.  Kore-
ans faced discrimination on all fronts, from their admittance to schools to their efforts 
to secure employment and housing.  Kawashima traces this discrimination from their 
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entry into the labor market, after being “severed from landed property in colonial Ko-
rea” by the cadastral survey the Japanese colonial government conducted from 1910–
1918, to their struggles to gain work in Japan’s day labor markets, to their difﬁculties in 
ﬁnding suitable housing from Japanese landlords unwilling to rent to foreigners.23)
The Japanese demonstrated their anti-Korean sentiments most blatantly following di-
sasters.  After the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake the Japanese police spread baseless 
rumors that Koreans were committing acts of terror (such as polluting water wells) that 
encouraged the senseless slaughter of over 7,000 Japan-based Koreans.  Under both 
normal and abnormal circumstances the Japanese consistently offered little encourage-
ment to Koreans who might otherwise have considered adopting Japanese culture.
Regardless of whether they planned to remain in Japan or return to Korea, for 
many the most attractive short-term option was to enroll their children in ethnic 
schools.  Yet, this decision made little sense to American occupation administrators 
who saw the most efﬁcient means of encouraging Korean assimilation (or repatriation) 
to be their studying alongside their Japanese counterparts.  SCAP refused to see the 
Korean efforts for what they were—attempts to protect the aspiration that their chil-
dren develop or maintain a sense of identity as Koreans.  Rather, SCAP interpreted 
them as efforts to encourage a larger cause—international communist revolution. 
Ryan joined other American ofﬁcials in tying the “riots” to left-wing efforts to disrupt 
the elections scheduled for May 10 in southern Korea.  She wrote that SCAP had even 
drawn up evacuation plans should Korean actions threaten American residents.
The Korean elections certainly have been watched from here with much interest 
for a long time.  The outbreak has been conﬁned to the Communists and the Ko-
reans, but for a time there was a great fear that the attack would be made on 
Americans and we were ready for it.  Right after the ﬁrst of the year hush-hush 
arrangements went on with preparations to evacuate all Americans from Korea if 
a riot broke out prior to the elections.  Kobe naturally would be the ﬁrst haven 
for them.  Ships came over from the States loaded down with food and it was 
stored here.  …  A month ago all petroleum products were cut off so that in case 
of evacuation there would be nothing left for the Reds to take over.  Then Mrs. 
Keeney and her baby … got out of there the last part of March as did many oth-
ers.  Many ships were out at sea ready to put in at Seoul and other ports in case 
evacuation became necessary even at the 11th hour.
She expressed relief that her suspicions this time came to naught: after “the elections 
have passed that fear is over for the time being at least.”
Ryan’s opinions again reﬂected those of her peers in Japan, as we see in Jenkins’s 
letter to William J. Sebald.  Jenkins suggested that Koreans were not especially con-
cerned over the future of their ethnic schools, but saw SCAP’s actions as an opportu-
nity to protest a more important issue, the upcoming elections.
With the elections in Southern Korea imminent, any clash between Koreans in 
Japan and the Occupation forces, which could be played up as demonstrating the 
Occupation supporting the Japanese against the Koreans, would serve as useful 
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propaganda ammunition in Southern Korea, and could also be used throughout 
the world as a further example of “American imperialism.”
The Korean leaders were presented with a ready made cause for mass protest by 
the closing of Korean schools by the Japanese authorities for the failure of the 
schools to comply with recently enacted education legislation.  No doubt, had 
this eminently satisfactory cause for protest not come to hand, the leaders would 
have invented another to obscure their underlying motive.24)
SCAP ofﬁcials might be excused for considering this possibility.  The days leading 
up to the May 10 elections were ﬁlled with violence between left-wing and right-wing 
factions.  The G-2 Periodic Reports of April 28, 1948, the day Ryan penned her ﬁrst 
letter on the Kobe “riots,” listed the following acts of “civil unrest” in southern Korea. 
A “mob of unknown size threw a homemade hand grenade into the home of a local 
election candidate”; the “South Korean Labor Party [SKLP] has issued instructions 
that all myo˘n [village] ofﬁces, police boxes and registration ofﬁces must be burned to 
destroy election records.  SKLP has also promised that arms sent by the North Korean 
Labor Party will be available by 10 May”; and “three members of the local election 
committee were killed and one seriously injured when attacked by a mob of 20 terror-
ists armed with spears and shotguns.”  This report also carried news of mob attacks on 
school principals, village heads, leaders of right-wing groups, and police ofﬁcers.25)  In 
addition, violent confrontations on a mass scale also broke out from April 1948 on the 
island of Cheju that left an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 of the islanders dead, and 
forced as many as 40,000 people to ﬂee to Japan.26)
While acts of violence committed by leftists against rightists received much more 
publicity in the U.S. reports, this bias probably better reﬂects the conservative tone of 
the reports than the actual situation.  The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), for exam-
ple, included in its reports similar acts of sabotage and violence that were instigated 
from both sides.27)  The violence by left-wing groups no doubt also reﬂected general 
U.S. oppression of this element from as early as February 1946, when the Military 
Government passed the Political Party Registration Act (Cho˘ngdang tuˇngnokpo˘p), a law 
that Kim Kut’ae compares favorably to the colonial-era Peace Preservation Act (Chian 
ijiho¯) enacted in 1925.28)  This oppression, and the fact that the election being limited 
to southern Korea strengthened the political divide between the two Koreas, led many 
left-wing groups to boycott the elections altogether.  The violence, for the most part, 
appeared to be over local issues involving the election process rather than a broader 
effort to advance communism globally.
While occupation ofﬁcials interpreted the Korean actions as inspired by commu-
nists, Koreans on the peninsula addressed the incident from a much different perspec-
tive.  A CIC report noted that both left-wing and right-wing Koreans viewed this “op-
pression of Koreans in Japan” as U.S. backing for a renewal of Japanese expansion in 
East Asia.  It paraphrased one left-wing newspaper article that reported “innocent Ko-
reans [being] oppressed and murdered not only by the Japanese but also by the US 
Army Forces in Japan.”  The report continued: “US leniency toward the Japanese is 
responsible for the renewal of brutality directed at the Korean people.”  Syngman 
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Rhee, who later became the Republic of Korea’s (ROK, or South Korea) ﬁrst presi-
dent, added that Koreans would have no difﬁculty choosing sides on this issue.29)
“Send Them All Back to Korea”
Elizabeth Ryan’s solution to the problem—send them all back to Korea, and if they 
do not want to return have them take Japanese citizenship—was a simplistic solution 
to a much more complex problem.  Yet, it was one frequently offered by high-level of-
ﬁcials in the Occupation and Japanese administrations.  Upon arriving in Kobe, 
Eichelberger remarked that he wished he “had the Queen Elizabeth here to ship the 
whole lot of them [Koreans] to Korea.”30)  Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru 
suggested in a letter to General Douglas MacArthur that the U.S. administration force-
fully return all Koreans who were unable to “contribute to [ Japan’s] reconstruction.” 
MacArthur sympathized with Yoshida’s general aim to rid Japan of this problem, but 
was unwilling to force Koreans to repatriate.  He lamented that should he do so they 
“would have their heads cut off” by the South Korean government as they were all 
“North Koreans,” in other words, communists.31)
Such suggestions were impractical for a number of reasons.  First, the idea that Ko-
reans should “return” to Korea made little sense to this people, many of whom had 
been born and raised in Japan.  The Japan-based Korean population consisted of a 
large number of ﬁrst-generation Koreans, but also a growing number of second-gener-
ation and third-generation Koreans.  For these latter people, Japan was the only 
“home” they knew.  They had little or no knowledge of their ancestral language and 
culture.  Indeed, some who had been raised as Japanese during the prewar and war-
time periods did not learn that they were of Korean ancestry until after Korea’s libera-
tion.  These deﬁciencies complicated the efforts of many repatriated Koreans to inte-
grate into Korean society, leading them to once again cross over (now illegally) into 
Japan.  As mentioned above, the 1947 Alien Registration Ordinance categorized all 
Japan-based Koreans as “foreigner” (or alien), even though SCAP expected the people 
to go to schools for “Japanese nationals.”32)  Feeling unaccepted in both Korean and 
Japanese culture, Koreans looked to the ethnic schools for an opportunity to reorient 
their children to their ancestral culture.  Even if Koreans could assume Japanese citi-
zenship, which they could not, there still remained the problem of whether the Japa-
nese would recognize them as such.33)
Ryan and Eichelberger might have recognized that U.S. policy also complicated 
their return to Korea.  Occupation policy severely limited the amount of belongings 
returnees (both Korean and Japanese) could bring.  One provision restricted them to 
taking only up to 1,000 yen in currency and all the belongings they could carry, which 
were not enough to survive a few weeks much less to restart their lives in a new envi-
ronment.34)  Additional problems awaited them upon arrival in southern Korea.  The 
war’s end and Korea’s division interrupted economic networks that Japan had nur-
tured throughout its East Asian empire.  This caused acute shortages in food, energy, 
and natural resources in southern Korea, which further curtailed the ability of all Ko-
reans to procure basic living essentials (housing and food), and critically limited their 
opportunities for employment.  U.S. Military Government projections for improve-
ment in these areas remained gloomy over the ﬁrst years of its administration of south-
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ern Korea.  In addition, news of political unrest in southern Korea and increasing mili-
tary confrontation with northern Korea also caused Koreans in Japan to think twice 
before returning to the Korean peninsula.35)
The Kobe “Riots” and SCAP’s “Reverse Course”
Missing from Ryan’s commentaries were answers to two important questions: why 
was it the Japanese (rather than the Americans) who issued these orders, and why did 
they wait until this particular time to order the schools’ closing?  The Korean situation 
in Japan represents one example where SCAP’s otherwise farsighted decision to fun-
nel its orders through a Japanese administration worked to its disadvantage.  To Japa-
nese, being issued directives directly from a Japanese administrative body, even 
though they were aware of their U.S. occupation origins, was palatable.  To Koreans, 
however, this same Japanese voice represented a continuation of four decades of colo-
nial rule, and thus was far less acceptable.36)  Having the Japanese government order 
the ethnic school to close only rekindled in Korean minds painful memories of Japan’s 
colonial rule, and the troubles that this regime had inﬂicted on this people over the 
past four decades.  As Koreans frequently reminded United States ofﬁcials, the above 
oversight represented a frequently seen pro-Japan bias in U.S. dealings with Japanese-
Korean relations.37)  Previously, U.S. ofﬁcials in Korea had ordered Japanese ofﬁcials 
to remain in their posts in the former colony.  This decision was practical in that it 
kept experienced people at their posts.  Predictably, however, it enraged Koreans who 
were in no mood to continue taking orders from Japanese or their Korean collabora-
tors.
The context under which Korean ethnic schools were closed cannot be divorced 
from other actions then taking place in Japan.  From 1947 SCAP initiated what has 
come to be known as the “reverse course,” in which the U.S. rolled back occupation 
policies that promoted democracy and demilitarization in Japan and came to concen-
trate efforts rather on Japan’s economic and political development.  These changes 
were inﬂuenced by the Truman Doctrine of March 1947.  Truman vowed to “help free 
peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggres-
sive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.”38)  In Japan, the 
Truman Doctrine was manifested in SCAP’s purging of thousands of suspected leftists 
from positions of inﬂuence and in returning Japanese ofﬁcials who had been purged 
immediately after the SCAP administration began to these positions, including a num-
ber of Class A war criminals.  The “reverse course” also ended plans to dismantle Jap-
anese conglomerates (zaibatsu ) and initiated discussions urging Japanese rearmament. 
The fear driving these changes was expressed by the director of the United States State 
Department Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, who during a March 1948 visit to 
Japan questioned whether “Japan’s powers of resistance to Communism could be tak-
en for granted.”39)  As China slipped into communism, the United States came to real-
ize the paramount position that Japan would play in East Asian political affairs. 
SCAP’s order to the Japanese to close Korean ethnic schools, which it believed served 
as a breeding ground for communist indoctrination, reﬂected the spirit of this policy 
reversal.
The upcoming elections in southern Korea may also have factored in the timing of 
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the schools’ closing.  The formation of a democratically elected national assembly, and 
the anticipated establishment of a Korean government, would offer Japan-based Kore-
ans the opportunity to register as South Korean nationals, which in turn might expe-
dite their repatriation.  This scenario was anticipated in the “Staff Study Concerning 
Koreans in Japan” dated August 16, 1948, and issued by the Ofﬁce of the United 
States Political Advisor at Tokyo one day after the government of South Korea was of-
ﬁcially established.  This study began by outlining the problem: “There are about 
600,000 Koreans in Japan; most of them were born in Korea or in Japan of Korean 
parents.  It is estimated that on a monthly average 650 Koreans enter Japan illegally 
and that 400 are repatriated or deported to Korea.”  It then summarized the efforts 
that SCAP had made to repatriate Japan-based Koreans:
SCAP policy toward Koreans in Japan has been twofold: a) … Koreans have 
been treated as liberated people and therefore strenuous efforts have been made 
to repatriate to Korea all Koreans in Japan who wished to return; b) Koreans 
who voluntarily continued to reside in Japan have been presumptively consid-
ered for purposes of treatment as retaining their Japanese nationality and are to 
be considered until such time as a duly established Korean Government accords 
them recognition as Korean nationals.
However, those Koreans who remained in Japan were reluctant to return to Korea due 
in part to the uncertain prospects in both halves of the peninsula.  Yet, at the same 
time their continued presence in Japan caused a number of problems.
Politically, Koreans have attempted to establish a large degree of autonomy in 
Japan.  Many of them have tended more and more to participate in communist 
activity, so that now the League of Koreans Residing in Japan, the principal Ko-
rean organization in Japan, is largely dominated by communists.  Koreans move 
illegally between Japan and Korea serve as the link between Japanese commu-
nists and those on the continent of Asia—Korean, Chinese, and Russian.  …  So-
cially the Koreans represent a group which does not readily assimilate to the Jap-
anese both because of the long-standing prejudice of the latter and because of the 
uneducated and generally underprivileged character of most of the Koreans in 
Japan.  …  The recent riots in Osaka and Kobe arising from refusal by the Kore-
ans to comply with orders of the Japanese Government afforded a test of the ex-
tent of Korean autonomy in Japan.  …  The riots have of course increased the 
bitterness between Japanese and Koreans, and it is undeniable that the Japanese 
would be only too happy to see all Koreans leave Japan.
The study then recommended changes to facilitate Korean repatriation that includ-
ed increasing the amount of currency with which they could return to 100,000 yen, of-
fering better protection for the part of their estate that exceeded this amount, and pro-
viding more convenient transportation and better terms for repatriation.  At the same 
time the Staff Study report acknowledged that these measures alone would be 
insufﬁcient to encourage complete repatriation.  Those who remained in Japan, it ad-
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vised, should be treated as Japanese nationals even if they registered as Koreans and 
held dual nationality, or if they reentered Japan after resettling in Korea.  The study 
did little to resolve the problems of Korean residents.  With the lone exception of the 
recommendation to increase the amount of their estate with which Koreans could re-
turn to Korea, SCAP made no changes in policy.  It washed its hands of the problem, 
and suggested that the South Korean and Japanese governments could negotiate a so-
lution after Japan regained sovereignty.  Only in 1965 did Japan and the Republic of 
Korea sign both a treaty to normalize their diplomatic relations and an agreement that 
set conditions for Japan-based Koreans to meet should they seek permanent residence 
in Japan.  Japan-North Korea relations have yet to be normalized.
The shock of the violent response by Koreans to SCAP’s order to close the Korean 
ethnic schools initially led to the occupation administration’s harsh reaction.  Yet, the 
incident as a whole also awakened SCAP to the need to negotiate with Korean lead-
ers.  On May 5, 1948, the Asahi Shinbun declared the problem solved when the Osaka 
and Kobe schools agreed to apply for authorization (ninka) as private schools.40)  The 
Korean population could only view this result as defeat, a compromise that beneﬁted 
the Japanese as it created separate Korean and Japanese schools.  Koreans, on the oth-
er hand, did gain the right to educate their children in a Korean environment and to 
offer them a limited Korean ethnic program.  But this was also an education that re-
mained subject to Japanese Ministry of Education directives.
Tension heightened after the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) in September 1948.  SCAP soon banned display of 
the DPRK ﬂag at rallies, subjugating violators to arrest and deportation to the ROK. 
Exactly one year later, SCAP enforced its April 1949 order for the League of Koreans 
to disband.  On September 9, 500 Japanese police ofﬁcers locked the doors of the or-
ganization’s headquarters.  The Japanese government again targeted ethnic schools by 
ordering 350 of them to close.  Of those that applied for private school status, only 
three were approved.  Other schools gained recognition as “miscellaneous schools” 
that were freed from Japanese inﬂuence, and thus able to develop a Korean-based cur-
riculum.41)  A half-century, later 90 percent of all Japan-based Korean children re-
ceived their education as minorities in Japanese schools, many obscured by the use of 
Japanese names, ﬂuent Japanese language abilities, and familiarity with Japanese cul-
ture and mannerisms.42)
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